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Objective. While scholars treat neighborhoods as important contexts of inequality, few studies
explore the social processes that create disparities in neighborhoods’ political capacities. How does
neighborhood social organization affect rates of political participation? Methods. We combine
surveys from the U.S. Census and Boston Neighborhood Survey (BNS), and administrative data
from the City of Boston. Accounting for spatial dependence, we fit a series of regression models
investigating the relationship between neighborhood social structure and four forms of political
engagement: community meeting attendance, contacting local government for services, and voter
turnout in a local and a national midterm election. Results. We find higher rates of political par-
ticipation in more stable neighborhoods, and lower rates of participation in neighborhoods with
higher concentrations of immigrants. The relationship between collective efficacy and rates of polit-
ical participation is not statistically significant in our models. We find a positive association between
concentrated disadvantage and city election turnout, but this association is nonlinear: beyond a
certain threshold, increases in disadvantage are associated with decreasing rates of participation.
Conclusion. We argue that neighborhoods are indeed political places, and residential stability, im-
migrant concentration, and—to a lesser extent—concentrated disadvantage are important factors
affecting the civic capacity of urban communities.
How does neighborhood social organization affect political behavior? Over a century of
urban sociology illustrates the ecological nature of human behavior and general well-
being. More recently, the so-called neighborhood effects literature depicts neighborhoods
as important sites for understanding inequality, crime, mobility, and, to a lesser extent,
civil society (Sampson, 2012). Some political theorists also conceptualize neighborhoods as
quasi-political communities, serving many functions of governance while simultaneously
being subjected to the power of the state (Crenson, 1983). Yet, to date, our understanding of
the social factors producing varying rates of political behavior across urban neighborhoods
remains limited (for a discussion, see Gay 2012).
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This article advances the literature on political behavior and urban inequality in two ways.
First, we build upon Sampson et al. (2005) and Ebert and Okamato (2013) by recognizing
the importance of social context in shaping aggregate political outcomes. While individual
attributes (attitudes and demographics) and institutional arrangements such as election
procedures (Winders, 1999) have received more attention in the literature on political
behaviors, we emphasize the community factors behind these behaviors. In doing so, we
echo Wuthnow’s argument that “the character of civic involvement must be understood in
terms of the social ecology of entire neighborhoods, rather than as an attribute of individuals
or families alone” (1998:112). Yet few studies investigate the neighborhood-level predictors
of political participation.
Second, we explore a range of political behaviors beyond the focus on collective civic
protests and self-reported civic participation emphasized in the neighborhood effects liter-
ature (Michener, 2013; Sampson et al., 2005; Swaroop and Morenoff, 2006). Attending
community meetings, contacting local government for services, and casting a ballot in a
state or local election illustrate different features of civic capacity. By investigating these
additional behaviors alongside one another, we can better understand the social processes
by which neighborhoods influence political outcomes.
With these theoretical and methodological goals in mind, we analyze neighborhood-level
rates of four political behaviors: voter turnout in a national midterm election, voter turnout
in a municipal election, contacting government for services, and community meeting at-
tendance. We draw on the literature in urban sociology to test the impact of four social
organizational factors on political participation: neighborhood stability, immigrant con-
centration, collective efficacy, and concentrated disadvantage. Our investigation focuses on
a single municipality, Boston, which allows us to analyze neighborhoods as interdependent
units. Specifically, we are able to fit models accounting for unobserved spatial processes
that may bias traditional models that assume neighborhood independence.
We find higher rates of political participation in more stable neighborhoods and lower
rates of participation in neighborhoods with higher concentrations of immigrants. We
do not find statistically significant associations between collective efficacy and political
behavior. Voter turnout in a city election is generally higher in more disadvantaged neigh-
borhoods, but the relationship is nonlinear; beyond a certain threshold, additional increases
in disadvantage are associated with diminishing rates of participation. In the discussion
section, we propose extensions of, and refinements to, existing theories based on these
findings. We argue that political behavior varies with neighborhoods’ social structure, and
conclude this article with theoretical implications for integrating urban sociology and the
study of political participation.
Neighborhood Social Context and Political Behavior
A long tradition of urban sociology emphasizes the importance of neighborhood context
for understanding social outcomes. In this section, we draw on the existing literature to
develop four hypotheses related to neighborhood-level political participation.
Neighborhood Stability
The character of a neighborhood is strongly determined by the permanence or tran-
sience of its residents’ ties to the community and each other. Urban sociologists have long
pointed out that for certain outcomes, the effects of neighborhood stability transcend an
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individual’s own residential tenure or even social class (Taylor, 1996). As Sampson notes,
“an individual in a highly mobile area faces quite different constraints than residents of stable
areas—regardless of his/her own length of residence” (Sampson, 1988, emphasis in orig-
inal). A resident newly arrived in a stable neighborhood is likely more capable of civic
engagement than a long-time resident of a neighborhood in constant flux. Residential sta-
bility produces neighborhood-level outcomes by creating a unique social context, greater
than the sum of individual residency decisions.
Previous research offers specific reasons to expect a positive relationship between neigh-
borhood stability and aggregate political behaviors. Neighborhood stabilizing processes,
like homeownership, foster intracommunity ties (Brisson and Usher, 2005), and lev-
els of community attachment or “communality” may have a positive impact on voting
(Zimmer, 1983). Additional research finds that homeownership, in particular, affects vot-
ing behavior through increased social ties and the transmission of community values
(McCabe, 2013) or through attempts of homeowners to maximize property values (Fis-
chel, 2001). In contrast to the stability provided by home ownership, Gay (2012) finds
residential mobility negatively impacts voting, which the author attributes to the loss of
social ties and connectedness. Neighborhood stability may also increase involvement in
local community organizations, though recent research finds mixed results (Swaroop and
Morenoff, 2006).
As such, we would expect that stable neighborhoods—specifically, those with larger
populations of homeowners, longer lengths of residence, and older populations—will
sustain local institutions and present more opportunities for prosocial behavior and civic
participation. Importantly, the effects of neighborhood stability may be manifested through
the actions of individuals, but it is the properties of communities such as the density of
homeowners, committed residents, and the elderly that create unique social contexts for
this individual political behavior. Therefore, we present the following hypothesis related to
neighborhood stability:
H1: Rates of political participation will be higher in stable neighborhoods due to increased
opportunities for social organization and feelings of “communality” (Sampson, 1988;
Zimmer, 1983).
Immigrant Concentration
Urban sociologists and political scientists have theorized both positive and negative re-
lationships between immigration patterns and social outcomes. Early research in urban
sociology suggested immigrant concentration destabilized communities and contributed
to social disorganization (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1919; Shaw and McKay, 1942). In
particular, population turnover by immigrants can destabilize local communities by ob-
structing interpersonal communication and undermining local institutions and networks
(Davies and Fagan, 2012). In this perspective, immigrant concentration is expected to re-
duce informal social control in neighborhoods and weaken social institutions. Immigrant
neighborhoods may also be isolated from mainstream political institutions and there-
fore detached from American politics. Research in political science supports this perspec-
tive, finding a negative relationship between immigrant concentration and voting (Cho,
Gimpel, and Dyck, 2006; Junn, 1999). Additionally, deep co-ethnic ties in dense immigrant
communities can reduce participation in local politics, as immigrants orient themselves
more to the politics of their homelands (Jones-Correa, 1998). If immigrant density affects
organizational capacity and co-ethnic ties reduce the symbolic importance of American
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political norms, we would expect political participation to decline with greater concentra-
tions of immigrants.
However, recent research connecting immigrant concentration and crime proposes
an “immigrant revitalization perspective” (Lyons, Vélez, and Santoro, 2013), or what
Sampson (2008) considers “the Latino paradox”: even in neighborhoods of high disad-
vantage, there is evidence that the concentration of immigrants reduces social problems.
A high concentration of immigrants can strengthen a neighborhood’s institutional base
of churches, social service providers, and community-based organizations, directly contra-
dicting the immigrant disorganization perspective. Immigrants can also spur neighborhood
revitalization, reversing economic decline. Thus, the immigrant revitalization perspective
suggests immigrant groups will be more active in citizen-directed political behaviors if
a capacity for social control translates to local civic action. Again, whether immigrant
concentration ultimately serves to galvanize or depress political behavior, our view is that
social context may shape political outcomes beyond the attributes of any single immigrant
or native-born person. We therefore present two contrasting hypotheses with respect to
immigrant concentration and neighborhood political behaviors:
H2a: The percent of foreign-born residents is negatively associated with rates of all political
behavior due to their detachment from the politics of their host societies (Jones-Correa,
1998).
H2b: The percent of foreign-born residents in a neighborhood is positively associated with
rates of political behavior due to institutional development and economic revitalization
(Lyons, Vélez, and Santoro, 2013).
Collective Efficacy
According to a rich tradition in urban sociology, neighborhood collective efficacy also
impacts civic behavior. While this research is most notable for its treatment of crime and
inequality, understanding how residents interact in a neighborhood offers a window into
the social structure of civic participation. In particular, neighborhoods vary in their capacity
to solve community problems and instill social norms of trust, which may affect rates of
political action.
Working trust and the capacity to intervene on behalf of the common good constitute
the two key elements of collective efficacy (Sampson et al., 1997). In this research, collective
efficacy represents the spatial context in which residents mobilize for an intended purpose.
“Moving away from a narrow focus on private ties and personal memberships,” Sampson
et al. write, “the concept of collective efficacy is meant to signify an emphasis on conjoint
capability for action to achieve an intended effect” (2005:676). When community members
share feelings of trust and competency, they are more likely to work towards shared goals.
Consequently, Sampson and his colleagues argue that collective efficacy relates to citizen-
directed political action, like collective civic protests. We therefore present the following
hypothesis:
H3: Neighborhood collective efficacy is positively associated with citizen-directed behavior
(community meeting attendance and service requests) since collective efficacy involves
mobilization for an intended purpose (Sampson et al., 2005).
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Concentrated Disadvantage
An especially important ecological approach to studying social life concerns neighbor-
hood disadvantage. Building on Wilson’s (1987) theory of concentrated poverty, a number
of studies analyze the impact of concentrated disadvantage on a variety of social outcomes
(Sharkey, 2013; Wodtke et al., 2011). Concentrated disadvantage is not simply a measure
of individual-level poverty or race. It encompasses racial disadvantage, weakened labor force
attachment, high rates of single parenthood, and welfare receipt—factors that combine to
produce a distinct ecological context. Research links concentrated disadvantage to social
inequality through a mechanism of social isolation, which Wilson defines as “the lack of
contact or sustained interaction with individuals and institutions that represent mainstream
society” (1987:60). If areas of extreme disadvantage are socially isolated from mainstream
institutions, we expect reduced rates of all types of political participation, since isolation
decreases the social enforcement of behavior and access to resources necessary for political
participation. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis:
H4: Rates of political behavior will be lower in neighborhoods of concentrated disadvan-
tage, due to the social isolation from mainstream institutions, resources, and conventional
behavioral role models (Wilson, 1987).
Data and Methods
Data Sources
We draw on four sources of data for our analyses. First, voter turnout data come from the
Boston Election Commission. We focus on the 2009 municipal election (including races
for mayor and city council) and the 2010 midterm election (including races for governor
and state representatives). The data include addresses for all registered voters eligible to
vote in each election, as well as all addresses of voters who actually cast a vote.
Second, our data on neighborhood meeting attendance and social organization come
from the Boston Neighborhood Survey (BNS) (Azrael et al., 2009). The BNS data include
a representative phone survey of 1,718 Boston adults collected in 2010. Third, our data
on city service requests come from the City of Boston’s Constituent Relationship Manage-
ment (CRM) system. Data are generated through a system similar to “311” that collects all
requests for basic city services—requests like fixing cracked sidewalks or removing graffiti
from public parks. We follow recent research (Lerman and Weaver, 2014; Levine and Ger-
shenson, 2014) by conceptualizing the data as a measure of direct citizen interactions with
the state. Finally, our demographic data come from the 2005–2009 American Community
Survey (ACS) five-year estimates.
Dependent Variables
For the 2009 and 2010 voter turnout data, we geo-coded the addresses of registered
and actual voters to create counts at the Census-tract level. We then created voter turnout
variables, representing the proportion of eligible voters (i.e., individuals registered to vote)
in each year who actually cast a vote.1
1Importantly, information on voter eligibility allows us to assess the impact of immigrant concentration on
voter turnout without concern for the legal barriers to voting posed by noncitizenship, since the denominator
in the dependent variable is the number of registered voters.
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We model voter turnout alongside two additional outcome variables. First, we use a BNS
survey question on community meeting attendance. The survey question asks respondents
if they attended a neighborhood meeting in the past year, “such as a community meeting,
crime watch meeting, or block meeting.” We calculate a tract-level mean from these
responses.
Second, we create a variable for city service requests that focuses on snow removal.
This is done out of concern for endogeneity, since rates of service requests may reflect
differential need or differential receipt of service. For example, poor neighborhoods may
be more likely to contact local government about housing violations because of poor
housing conditions, or wealthy neighborhoods may be more likely to request bulk item
pickups because of consumption patterns. However, when need and receipt of service is
constant, Levine and Gershenson (2014) argue that variation in service requests represents
an important dimension of citizen-directed political behavior. We borrow the authors’
technique to account for exogenous sources of variation in demand for city services by
focusing on snowplow requests during official snowstorms. During snowstorms, all city
streets need snowplows, and so variation in requests can reasonably be attributed to variation
in the propensity to contact local government. We geo-coded snowplow requests during
snowstorms throughout the winter of 2010–2011 and created tract-level counts.
Independent Variables
To empirically test theories of neighborhood stability, we created a composite measure
based on three variables from the ACS. Neighborhood-level scores on this measure are a
function of percent homeownership, percent of population that has moved in the last year, and
the median age of residents. We conducted a principal components analysis and confirmed a
single factor of stability (eigenvalue of 2.07), which we used to create a regression-weighted
scale. To measure immigrant concentration, we simply use the percent of foreign-born
residents in the neighborhood according to the ACS.
The measure for collective efficacy was created as the mean of 10 BNS survey items
capturing social cohesion and social control. The survey items were adapted directly from
previous research (Sampson et al., 1997). The scale demonstrated high internal reliability,
with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.87 (Rothman et al., 2011). We use tract-level means in our
models.
We also created a measure for concentrated disadvantage based on demographic variables
from the ACS. Following Sampson et al. (2007), we focused on six characteristics of
Census tracts: welfare receipt, poverty, unemployment, female-headed households, racial
composition (percent black), and population under 18. Like our measure of neighborhood
stability, we conducted a principal component analysis and confirmed a single factor of
concentrated disadvantage (eigenvalue of 4.03), which we used to generate a regression-
weighted scale from the six neighborhood characteristics.
Finally, we include control variables for population size, percent currently enrolled in
college, and percent employed by city government.2 In models regressing on plow requests,
we additionally control for the percent of residents who commute to work by automobile
and the length of streets in that neighborhood. Table 1 includes descriptive statistics for
our key independent and dependent variables.
2We do not control for neighborhood racial composition due to collinearity with our measures for concen-
trated disadvantage and immigrant concentration. However, controlling for percent Hispanic and percent Asian







Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables
City turnout 156 0.4372 0.1237 0.1481 0.8101
Midterm turnout 156 0.542 0.097 0.3333 0.8137
Meeting attendance 155 0.2989 0.178 0 1
Service requests 156 26.02 27.04 0 185
Descriptive Statistics for Select Independent Variables
Neighborhood stability 156 −3.19 × 10−9 1 −3.378 2.468
Immigrant concentration 156 0.261 0.1329 0.0134 0.6864
Collective efficacy 156 3.709 0.32 2.95 4.4
Concentrated disadvantage 156 −2.08 × 10−9 1 −1.327 2.401
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Correlation Matrix for Dependent Variables
(I) City turnout 1
(II) Midterm turnout 0.714 1
(III) Meeting attendance −0.0069 0.1153 1
(IV) Service requests 0.4576 0.4931 −0.0372 1
Correlation Matrix for Selected Independent Variables
(I) Neighborhood stability 1
(II) Immigrant concentration −0.1888 1
(III) Collective efficacy 0.3455 −0.5288 1
(IV) Concentrated disadvantage −0.1268 0.2653 −0.55 1
Estimation Strategy
We fit negative binomial models when predicting contact rates, since our outcome is an
overdispersed count variable. We fit generalized linear models (using a logit link function
and the binomial family for variance) when predicting fractional response variables such
as neighborhood meeting attendance and voter turnout (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996).
All models use Huber-White robust standard errors. Focusing on a single municipality,
we are also able to account for spatial dependence in our models (Baller et al., 2001;
Swaroop and Morenoff, 2006). Spatial dependence can occur when political participation
in a neighborhood is systematically influenced by participation in adjacent neighbor-
hoods. These spatially correlated unobservables—for instance, ward- or precinct-based
voter mobilization strategies that include multiple adjacent neighborhoods, or spatially in-
terdependent city service operations—can affect estimates. We therefore account for spatial
dependence by including spatial lag covariates (based on Rook contiguity matrices) in all
of our models. Our models draw on Census tracts, and we use “tract” and “neighborhood”
interchangeably.
Results
Table 2 displays results from multivariate regression models of our four dependent
variables. For each outcome, we pair models that do and do not include a quadratic term
for concentrated disadvantage, as previous research illustrates nonlinear effects on civic























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































participation (Swaroop and Morenoff, 2006). The models displayed contain the full set
of explanatory and control variables. We did consider models that contained only those
explanatory variables that were theoretically most likely to be substantially associated with
both the explanatory and the dependent variable.
Table 2 is organized in paired columns by outcome. The explanatory variables in the
rows of Table 2 are organized according to the order we introduced our hypotheses.
Estimated coefficients for neighborhood stability are positive and significant for the
two turnout models as well as contacting for service, offering support for the claim that
stability in a neighborhood produces a social context conducive to political participation
(H1). A standard deviation increase in neighborhood stability has an average marginal
effect of 6.1 percentage points on statewide elections and 6.9 percentage points on local
elections. Similarly, such an increase is associated with the number of requests for snow
removal increasing from around 20 per neighborhood to around 27. Neighborhood sta-
bility is estimated to have a negative effect on meeting attendance, but the coefficient is
only statistically significant when controlling for the concentrated disadvantage quadratic
term.
We also find that percent foreign born is estimated to have a negative effect on
all four political behaviors, as predicted in H3a. Each 10 percentage point increase
in the foreign- born population is associated with a 2.1 percentage point decrease in
turnout for state elections, a 4.6 percentage point decrease in meeting attendance, and
four fewer requests for snow removal per neighborhood. However, the estimate for
turnout in a local election is not significant. We emphasize that the explanatory mech-
anism cannot be citizenship, since we measure turnout as a percentage of all registered
voters.
We find that collective efficacy has negative point estimates for meeting attendance
and service requests, and a positive point estimate for voter turnout. However, none of
the coefficients are statistically significant. These results do not support our hypothesized
relationships in H4. These surprising patterns will be elaborated on in the discussion
section.
Concentrated disadvantage is estimated to have a negative point estimate for midterm
election turnout and meeting attendance, though these coefficients are not statistically
significant. Contradicting our prediction in H5, concentrated disadvantage is estimated to
have a positive and statistically significant effect on local election turnout. Each standard
deviation increase in concentrated disadvantage is estimated to have an average marginal
effect of 2.2 percentage points on local turnout rates. However, as we demonstrate in
Figure 1, the relationship is nonlinear. The dotted line in Figure 1 shows that the relationship
between concentrated disadvantage and city election turnout is positive, but starting at
about half of a standard deviation from the mean, additional increases in disadvantage are
associated with declining rates of participation.
Our control for spatial dependence merits further discussion. These controls are statisti-
cally significant in models estimating voter turnout, but not in those estimating community
meeting attendance or city service requests. This provides evidence of a spatial “spill-over”
effect, as voting participation may diffuse via social networks or mobilization strategies that
transcend geographic boundaries.
Figure 2 graphs our key independent variables from Table 2. We display standardized
coefficients, and bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
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FIGURE 1
Predicted Rates of City Election Turnout by Level of Concentrated Disadvantage
FIGURE 2
Key Predictors from Table 2
NOTE: The figure shows standardized coefficients from Table 2, Models I, III, V, and VII, with error bars.
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TABLE 3
Multilevel Regression Models for Meeting Attendance with Random Intercepts and
Individual-Level, Tract-Level, and Spatial Lag Controls
(I) (II)
Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er.
Neighborhood stability −0.193 ∗ 0.087 −0.268 ∗∗ 0.093
Immigrant concentration −1.138 0.635 −1.905 ∗∗ 0.713
Collective efficacy −0.009 0.311 −0.089 0.313
Concentrated disadvantage 0.066 0.091 0.178 0.103
Disadvantage squared −0.194 ∗ 0.080
Individual measures
Male 0.019 0.118 0.000 0.119
Neighborhood tenure 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003
Homeowner 0.622 ∗∗∗ 0.135 0.629 ∗∗∗ 0.135
Over age 50 0.028 0.375 0.042 0.376
College degree 0.416 ∗∗ 0.129 0.429 ∗∗ 0.129
African American 0.215 0.166 0.239 0.166
Hispanic 0.111 0.246 0.108 0.246
Foreign born −0.177 0.158 −0.152 0.159
Controls
Percent college students −0.907 0.718 −1.324 0.736
Percent city employees 0.694 1.453 0.230 1.464
Population −0.048 0.040 −0.042 0.040
Spatial lag −0.689 0.677 −0.644 0.681
N (individuals) 1,580 1,580
N (tracts) 155 155
Log likelihood −926.093 −923.126
NOTES: N = 156. Constant terms not shown.∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).∗∗p < 0.01.∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Robustness Check: Multilevel Analysis
As a robustness check, we fit a multilevel logistic regression model on data that include
individual-level measures of meeting attendance. Individual-level controls include gender,
neighborhood tenure, homeownership, age (over 50), college education, African-America race,
Hispanic ethnicity, and whether the respondent is foreign born. Tract-level controls remain
the same, except now tract-level intercepts are allowed to vary randomly.3 The estimates
from these models are displayed in Table 3.
Most importantly, the findings from Table 2 are reproduced in Table 3. Looking at
Model II, neighborhood stability and immigrant concentration still predict lower levels of
meeting attendance among tract residents. Concentrated disadvantage still has a curvilinear
association with meeting attendance, such that the residents of the most disadvantaged
tracts have lower levels of meeting attendance.
At the individual level, we find that homeowners and the college educated are more
likely to attend meetings than other residents. The coefficient for neighborhood tenure
is not significant, suggesting that stakes acquired through homeownership may be more
3We also fit models that allowed the slopes for each individual-level variable to vary randomly. These models
had substantively identical findings to those displayed in Table 3.
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important to meeting attendance than are stakes acquired through length of residence.
Racial and ethnic group membership does not predict meeting attendance in these models,
nor does immigrant status.
Importantly, the fact that the estimated coefficients for tract-level variables remain sig-
nificant in models controlling for individual-level factors suggests that our findings in
Table 2 are not explainable solely as the aggregation of individual residents’ characteristics.
Unfortunately, we lack individual-level data on voting and service requests. However, the
models in Table 3 demonstrate the plausibility of neighborhood-level effects on individual
political behaviors. That is, even geographical units as small as tracts may have unique
political cultures.
Discussion
Our analysis investigates the connections between neighborhood social organization
and political behavior. We focus on four social processes theorized in the neighborhood
effects literature—neighborhood stability, immigrant concentration, collective efficacy, and
concentrated disadvantage—and extend them to the study of political participation.
Our results mostly support the hypothesis that residential stability positively impacts
neighborhood political behavior (H1). The results provide evidence that neighborhoods
with high concentrations of stable stakeholders—homeowners, long-time residents, older
populations—foster shared understandings of social goals through repeated interactions.
These relationships strengthen over time, due to residents’ collective commitment to their
communities. Moreover, the findings suggest that a neighborhood context characterized
by older, established residents reinforces participatory norms, translating into higher rates
of political participation. These findings have important implications for housing policy,
insofar as political elites and policymakers are interested in community participation. By
encouraging greater homeownership in urban neighborhoods, policymakers may facilitate
greater community participation in political affairs.
We also find mostly consistent support for theories predicting a negative relationship
between the concentration of immigrants in a neighborhood and political behaviors. While
the coefficient predicting voter turnout in the 2009 municipal election is not statistically
significant in any of our model specifications, nearly all of the coefficients for immi-
grant concentration are negative, supporting the mechanism of limited attachment to
government (H2a). Our results therefore do not support recent “immigrant revitalization”
perspectives, reflected in H2b. This research, prominent (though contested) in the crim-
inology literature, suggests concentrations of immigrants create neighborhood contexts
characterized by strong institutions and robust norms of social control (Lyons, Vélez, and
Santoro, 2013). While this may be true in the context of crime and violence, we do not
see those social processes translating into local political action. Rather, the results suggest
a community context of political detachment—at least with respect to our measures of
political participation.
We do not interpret our results as a blanket dismissal of immigrant political activity,
particularly in contexts other than Boston. Other immigrant communities, such as Ari-
zona Latinos in the wake of SB 1070, may undertake political action at much higher
rates than our Boston case. Additionally, immigrant communities may engage in different
types of political behavior not included in our models, such as identity-based rallies that
strengthen group boundaries (Ebert and Okamoto, 2013). Future research might address
these complexities with alternative samples beyond the Boston case.
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We do not find statistically significant relationships between collective efficacy and
political participation, contrary to H3. Theories of collective efficacy suggest that social
control, interpersonal trust, and a latent capacity to organize should create a social context
conducive to citizen-directed, instrumental action. Our results do not support this claim,
and as such, suggest a need to refine theories of collective efficacy. One explanation for the
null results relates to how political behavior is understood by collective efficacy theorists.
In these theories, the willingness of residents to intervene on behalf of the public good is
situated rather than global, and illustrates a latent capacity to act for intended purposes.
A neighborhood’s efficacy, Sampson et al. write, “exists relative to specific tasks such
as maintaining public order and providing local services” and “is best observed under
conditions of challenge” (2005:676). Unlike collective civic action events for social change,
studied by Ebert and Okamoto (2013) and Sampson (2012), the political behaviors in our
study are routine behaviors and not necessarily in response to immediate threats, challenges,
or conflict. In the context of existing research, our nonsignificant results may point to the
central importance of a political threat underlying a community’s capacity to intervene on
behalf of the public good.
Our findings for concentrated disadvantage are perhaps the most surprising. While
we find a nonlinear association with city election turnout—consistent with Swaroop and
Morenoff (2006)—we do not find statistically significant relationships with our other
outcomes of interest. Concentrated disadvantage is widely used to explain place-based
dimensions of inequality, so we expected the theory to apply to neighborhood political
behaviors as well. When Wilson (1987) writes that areas of concentrated disadvantage
are characterized by an ecological context of social isolation, he is primarily concerned
with economic and social institutions—labor markets, welfare dependency, and family
structure—and not mainstream political institutions. Similar to our observations regard-
ing the appropriate scope conditions for studying immigrant revitalization and collective
efficacy, our findings also point to a refinement of the concentrated disadvantage thesis:
concentrated disadvantage may matter most for economic and social isolation. The neigh-
borhood context of political behavior, by contrast, exhibits different empirical patterns. We
believe this is an important theoretical distinction for future studies of urban inequality
and concentrated disadvantage to consider.
Conclusion
Our study investigates the social processes producing neighborhood-level variation in
political behaviors. Drawing on a mix of survey and administrative data from the City of
Boston, we test five theories predicting four political outcomes. We advance the literature
on urban neighborhoods and political participation by focusing on the community context
of behavior, and by analyzing multiple behaviors alongside one another. Our findings
suggest that urban neighborhoods are, indeed, political places, exhibiting varying rates
of political behaviors with implications for the neighborhood effects literature in urban
sociology.
The preceding analysis is limited in ways that future research can address. First, our study
is restricted to the 156 neighborhoods of a single city; additional studies can investigate
how neighborhood political behavior may vary across different urban contexts and political
jurisdictions. Particulars of the Boston case—like the city’s specific mix of immigrants,
relative parochialism of neighborhoods, or other aspects of social structure—may relate to
neighborhood political outcomes. Replication of our empirical analysis outside of Boston
can test whether city-specific dynamics mediate the relationship between neighborhood
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social organization and aggregate political participation—another opportunity to build and
refine theory. Our study is also cross-sectional, and so future work can draw on longitudinal
data to better understand how changes to neighborhood social context produce different
rates of political participation. Though we are able to fit a multilevel model on one of
our outcomes, additional research can weigh the relative importance of individual- and
neighborhood-level factors for other political outcomes. Overall, additional spatial and
temporal variation would allow for alternative analytical techniques—such as hierarchical
modeling or fixed effects—which may lead scholars toward further extensions of the theories
tested in our analysis.
These limitations notwithstanding, future research should continue to unpack the factors
contributing to neighborhoods’ varying political capacity. We agree with political scien-
tist Matthew Crenson that neighborhoods are more than territorial units. Under certain
conditions, they can exhibit governance, resembling what he calls mini polities, or inter-
dependent political societies. In Neighborhood Politics, Crenson writes: “Once we know
something of the extent and configuration of today’s political societies, we may also be able
to facilitate their maintenance and formation” (1983:20). Insofar as the civic vitality of
urban neighborhoods contributes to the maintenance of democracy, future research should
address what makes places political, and how to support their political capacities.
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